Some Thoughts on Learning and Understanding by Hooper David
107
Some Thoughts on Learning 
and Understanding
David Hooper　
Learning is a continual process that occurs throughout life. 
Whether intentional or otherwise, it seems clear that individuals con-
stantly change or modify their behaviour as a result of prior experiences. 
They learn to act in certain ways in order to achieve, or perhaps avoid, 
particular outcomes.  This learning may not necessarily be a conscious 
process, nor indeed may it be possible to rationalise or identify exactly 
what has been learnt or understood.  Nevertheless, the knowledge we 
have expands as our range of experience grows.
The whole industry of education is centred on this concept of en-
hancing and facilitating the learning process.  Both teachers and learn-
ers generally have a coherent set of beliefs about knowledge and how 
this process of learning does and should occur.  Whilst such views may 
not be verbally articulated or explicitly expressed, they will, neverthe-
less, become apparent from the attitudes and practices that are adopted. 
Argyris (1976) made the distinction between what he described as “es-
poused theory” and “theory-in-use:” the former being the “official” view 
regarding education; the latter being the implicitly held theory that 
determines the strategies adopted. Although the theory-in-use may not 
be recognised as a theory as such, Biggs (1994) is undoubtedly correct 
in his assertion that:
“Any deliberate act is founded on some sort of theory, a coherent 
set of assumptions.  You do this rather than that because you think it 
will work, and it will work because…of this, or the other.”
Indeed, constant manipulation of the learning environment by 
teachers in order to create a more optimal setting in which learning will 
occur is a requirement of every conscientious teacher.  Just how well 
students respond, however, will be largely determined by the beliefs 
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and expectations that are held.  Kember (2001), from a study with 
university-aged students in Hong Kong, came to the conclusion that:
“…this set of beliefs about knowledge learning and teaching 
is a fundamental factor in determining how well students cope with 
higher education and what they get from it.  There is enough evidence 
to suggest that these beliefs should be addressed in helping students to 
cope with higher education.”  (p. 220)
This set of beliefs is clearly going to be influenced to some 
degree by the culture within which individuals function and operate. 
Individual differences notwithstanding, there are approaches to learning 
and teaching that seem to have common traits identifiable within a 
specific cultural group.
A primary impetus for this paper stemmed f rom personal 
experience and observations over a number of years of learning and 
teaching a traditional Japanese martial art, Shotokan Karate.  There 
seems to be a widely-held, yet misplaced, belief amongst some students 
that the Japanese have an in-built predisposition for learning karate 
that gives them something of an edge.  Whilst it may be true that 
karate—at least, karate in its current form—originated in Japan, why 
should the Japanese have any greater propensity towards karate than say 
the English have towards football, or those of Greek nationality have 
to engage in philosophical speculation?  The answer, of course, is “they 
don’t.”  However, teaching and training in a number of diverse cultural 
settings with teachers and students of quite different backgrounds 
led to the formulation of a number of questions about learning and 
understanding in general, and how we evaluate and measure these 
notions.
Students clearly arrive at the learning situation (in this case, a 
dojo) with a set of preconceived notions and beliefs about how this 
learning process is going to take place.  It soon becomes apparent that 
there exist a number of conventions regarding how classes are con-
ducted, the ways in which things are explained (or not explained) and 
the “system” of imparting knowledge and assessing how successfully 
students have learned and understood.  Japanese students with a Japa-
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nese teacher readily accept the format.  Even those with no experience 
of traditional Japanese arts appear to have little difficulty in accepting a 
style of instruction that to someone unfamiliar with the Japanese tradi-
tion would be quite alien.  Indeed, when Japanese instructors have to 
teach abroad, or are suddenly faced with foreign students with very dif-
ferent beliefs and expectations about how this learning process should 
evolve, it quickly becomes apparent that without some adaptation on 
the part of both teacher and learners, difficulties are going to arise.
Invariably it is left to the assessment procedure to decide whether 
“learning” has taken place.  Has this interaction between the teacher 
and students brought about the desired result—a result that, presum-
ably, can be observed and confirmed by the assessment procedure ad-
opted?  Are the students better, more skillful, more knowledgeable than 
before?  Have they, in fact, “understood?”  
The question seems quite straightforward; after all, surely there 
is a generally accepted agreement on what it means to “understand” 
something?  An examination of the cognitive and educational psychol-
ogy literature however, reveals few successful attempts to accurately 
define this abstract concept, despite its prodigious use within education. 
Indeed, learning and understanding are often used interchangeably.  
It does not automatically follow, of course, that when we talk 
about learning and understanding in relation to a physical skill like ka-
rate that we are necessarily talking about the same kinds of activity or 
mental processes that occur in a more typically academic setting.  Cer-
tainly, some theories about how learning and understanding takes place 
are more applicable to education, and Biggs (1994) warns against the 
danger of assuming the existence of an all-encompassing theory that is 
just waiting there for psychologists to finally define and articulate:
“… the strategy of top down application of the One Correct 
Theory is simply misguided, essentially because psychologically-based 
theories are derived to explain the data emerging from laboratory con-
texts, and they are stretched to snapping point when applied to class-
room and institutional contexts.”
However, regardless of the context or the setting, there are clearly 
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a number of variables that interact in some complex way and result in 
what we refer to as learning and understanding. 
In a recent study in Hong Kong (Marton et al, 1997), school 
children (aged between 12 and 18) were asked to articulate their under-
standing of learning.  They used the two terms quite interchangeably. 
When discussing about whether they had “learned” or “understood” 
something, the students described their views about what had occurred 
by completing their sentences in the following ways:
...then you can do it again, then you can say it again, then you 
can tell it back…
or
…then you can do (say, tell) it again, somewhere else, at another 
time…
or
…then you can do (say, tell) it somewhat differently (e.g., you can 
tell it in your own words)…
or
…then you can do (say, tell) something different… (Marton et al, 
1997)
In the same paper, Marton et al reported that Uruguayan stu-
dents describe their understanding of the process of learning as a se-
quence: 
understanding (1)—learning—understanding (2)
The initial understand (understanding 1) is a very superficial 
understanding in which the explanation of what is to be learnt is recog-
nized.  This is then worked on in some way until it is grasped (learning) 
and then finally it is understood to the extent that it has become appro-
priated for the learner to use (understanding 2).
Fazey and Marton (2002) point to an alternate study by Mugler 
and Landbeck (1994) where a very similar distinction was found be-
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tween learning and understanding amongst students from the Univer-
sity of the South Pacific, but where the similar three-phase process was 
actually transposed:
Learning (1)—understanding—learning (2).
They observe that:
“…whilst there seem to be categorical differences within the 
pattern when pooling results from different cultures the two phenom-
ena (learning and understanding) become indistinguishable across 
the pattern of variation or in the way in which they are differently 
assembled…
The point we are trying to make is that even if individual students 
had differentiated learning and understanding as different phenomena, 
on the group level the same pattern of variation appears in relation to 
both.  In that sense, the two are indistinguishable.  It also seems rea-
sonable to assume that what the high-school students in Hong Kong 
referred to as ‘that which you have understood’ or ‘that which you have 
really learned’ is what, in other studies at university level, is represented 
by an outcome or product category in a three phase sequence of knowl-
edge acquisition.” (p. 236)
Clearly, people have different ideas regarding how learning and 
understanding should be distinguished, and the most cursory glance at 
the literature reveals the struggle psychologists have had in formulating 
a satisfactorily precise description of what we mean by the term learn-
ing.
Ammons, back in 1988, was no doubt representative of many 
researchers when he expressed a sense of frustration at the futility of 
trying to define this seemingly elusive notion, and suggested, somewhat 
tongue-in-cheek, that: 
“Perhaps we should ban the concept of learning and confine our-
selves to finding what variables at what levels lead to how much resis-
tance to change after what prior experiences.” (Ammons, 1988. p. 288)
Nickerson (1985) suggested that:
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“Understanding is an active process.  It requires the connecting 
of facts, the relating of newly acquired information to what is already 
known, the weaving of bits of knowledge into an integral and cohesive 
whole.  In short, it requires not only having knowledge but also doing 
something with it.”  (p. 217)
More recently, educational research has recognized the impor-
tance of understanding as an integral part of learning.  Certainly all 
constructivist conceptions of learning and development see learning as 
a process that involves understanding (Duffy & Jonasson, 1992; Phil-
lips. 1995).   The key point, however, is the ability to demonstrate this 
notion of understanding by applying the knowledge in some novel way. 
Perkins (1994, 1998) describes it thus:
“Understanding is being able to carry out a variety of actions or 
‘performances’ that show one’s grasp of a topic and at the same time 
advance it… It is being able to take knowledge and use it in new ways.” 
(p. 6; p.13)
In my own area of interest, karate, the process of understanding 
has nothing to do with a cognitive analysis.  The study of karate is 
not an academic educational pursuit of knowledge.  Students do not 
intellectualise new knowledge or engage in meta-cognitive processes in 
the same way that they may do in other areas of study.  Although some 
students may be able to explain the course of a new movement, have 
some image of how it should be performed, or even be able to articulate 
to a degree how the new movement ‘feels,’ the only evidence that any 
understanding has occurred will be largely determined by changes in 
subsequent movements or actions. The idea of a performance view of 
understanding, then, seems intuitively applicable to the acquisition of a 
physical skill where an introspective knowledge or understanding of the 
new ‘knowledge’ is not present, although the new skill is demonstrably 
evident.  Perkins’ (1995) call for critical scrutiny of the perceived and 
often assumed connection between mental representations (mental 
models or schemas) and understanding is highly relevant here, and his 
cautionary example related to ordinary language comprehension and 
development appears most apt:
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“In some sense, people understand the syntax of their mother 
tongue.  They decode it and produce speech flexibly with it.  Yet, apart 
from tenuous memories of grammar instruction, people generally 
lack introspectable mental representations that mediate these acts of 
understanding.  People act effectively without knowing the rules in any 
ordinary sense.” (p. 2-3)
The same is certainly true for those engaged in learning and 
producing a movement skill or martial art.
When we talk of a person having learned karate to a certain level, 
we generally end up measuring “performance” against a certain level of 
criteria or threshold level of competence.  Can he or she perform this 
particular action or series of movements without displaying identi-
fied errors that would mark him or her as a novice or beginner?  Has 
he or she learned how to move and evade a pre-designated attack in 
the prescribed way, and respond with a technique that will be judged 
sufficiently well executed—with balance, appropriate timing, strength 
and power?  Such an assessment of learning fits in very well with the 
ideas we have about “intended outcomes.”  The models of learning that 
emerged in the wake of the cognitive revolution typically follow such 
approaches to learning and training that identify legitimate “functional” 
goals (e.g., Pew, 1974; Schmidt, 1975, 1976).  The assessment proce-
dures are set up to determine whether these goals have been met, and 
whether or not the learner’s performance meets the prescribed criteria.
It is very common to hear individual learners described as “natu-
rally talented” or “skillful,” and whilst certainly in the karate world in-
dividuals begin with differences in levels of coordination, flexibility or 
strength, the process by which they learn and understand how to move 
and respond involves a complex interaction of numerous factors, not 
least of which includes their previous experiences (not necessarily relat-
ed directly to karate at all), their expectations and the context in which 
they are taught.  
In psychology, notions such as intelligence, talent, ability, skill, 
giftedness and cognition have traditionally been used in association 
with individual learners, as if this whole process of learning and under-
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standing was something that was going on in the minds of individuals 
(Fodor, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972).  Barab and Plucker (2002) warn 
that:
“This line of thinking, rooted in Cartesian dualism (Descartes, 
1637/1978), is founded on the separation of the learner from the learn-
ing context, effectively isolating the body from its mind, the self from 
its world, the content from its context, and ability from those situations 
in which one is competent (Barab et al.,1999; Turvey & Shaw, 1995). 
Especially in discussions of talent, intelligence, giftedness, and related 
topics, researchers have traditionally located constructs in the minds of 
those considered talented or intelligent, or gifted, or not.” (p. 165)
Barab and Plucker (2002) go on to warn that educators too are 
also guilty of having fallen victim to the same circular logic where:
“Traditional, entity-based theories, placed knowledge in the head 
of the learner, which led to the creation of educational systems that fo-
cused on transmitting content into individual minds” (p. 165)
Much of the “theory-in-use” in current education clearly stems 
from this assumption that knowledge needs to be absorbed by the 
learner in some way.  The context—the classroom, the dojo, the “educa-
tional setting” or “learning environment”—is regarded as a fixed reality 
in the sense that perception of that reality is the property of the indi-
vidual mind.  It is the individual that acts upon that environment and 
has an impact upon that reality.  There is a complete separation of mind 
and matter which:
“… [results] in a set of post-Cartesian dualisms: stimulus versus 
response, behaviorist versus cognitive, reactive versus motivated, innate 
versus learned, talented versus incompetent—all of which stem from 
the surrounding dualism separating individual and environment.” (Bar-
ab & Plucker, 2002, p. 167)
With the learner and the context polarised in this way, notions 
such as ability and talent are thus seen as possessions of the individual. 
Snow (1992), in discussing the problems of traditional theories of apti-
tude, thus concludes that:
“The conceptual limitation derives from our tendency to think of 
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persons and situations as independent variables, rather than [thinking 
of ] person-in-situations as integrated systems.  To build the aptitude 
theories of tomorrow, we need a language for describing the processes 
that connect persons and situations—the processes that operate in their 
interface.” (p. 19)
The roots of this thinking are evident in the traditional theory of 
abstraction which Bolton (1977) has pointed out can be traced all the 
way back through the works of Lock (1690) and Hume (1739) to Ar-
istotle.  The theory holds that through the process of abstracting certain 
resemblances from amongst otherwise dissimilar stimuli, knowledge 
is acquired and concepts are formed.  Central to this view, and indeed 
common to all views and theories that deserve to be called cognitive, 
is the belief that behaviour is never merely a reflex action to presented 
stimuli, but rather something intentional, no matter how faintly defined 
that intent might be for the subject or the observer.
Underlying this theory, then, is the assumption that knowledge 
and the formation of concepts (what we might think of as “under-
standing”) relies in some way on the individual recognising similarities 
between stimuli.  These similarities are thus seen as a property of the 
subject’s environment and all he or she is required to do is to attend to 
them; what Bolton (1977) refers to as:
“… a one-way causality—the world impresses itself upon a sub-
ject who has no point of view of his own—and it becomes quite impos-
sible to do justice to the diversity of points of view which inform our 
concepts.” (p. 11)
It is interesting that criticism of the traditional theory of abstrac-
tion has come primarily from philosophers more than psychologists. 
Many educationalists’ theorising—espoused or otherwise—reveals this 
underlying acceptance that learning and understanding (whether it be 
described as knowledge acquisition, skill acquisition or concept forma-
tion) is in some way related to classification; consequently, they ignore 
the many other ways in which people organise their experience:
“…although we may talk of the general features of conceptualisa-
tion, those forces which constrain and channel the development of con-
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cepts into particular forms must not be ignored.  The subject develops 
in a particular environment…; he is a member of a certain society…; he 
uses a particular language and is guided by certain values.  These facts 
raise the question of the extent to which concept formation is influ-
enced by social and linguistic variations.” (Bolton, 1977, p. 19)
The issue that Bolton addresses here almost thirty years ago is 
essentially the same that Barab & Plucker (2002) refer to when they 
point out that the socially agreed upon labels and terms that are com-
monly used in education and psychology (such as ability, talent, expertise 
and intelligence), mitigate against the notion of a relationship between 
individuals and their environment that is dynamic, continually evolving, 
and highly contextual in nature. They argue that:
“…instead of advocating for the systematic and didactic separa-
tion of individual from environment, an ecological or relational model 
points to the importance of fully contextualized experience through 
which individuals, environments, and the sociocultural structures and 
relations transact.  In this line of thinking, the place to look for talent is 
not in the head or in the environment, but in the variables of the “flow 
itself.”  Talent, or evidence of being knowledgably skilful, is thus con-
sidered present when individuals, frequently using multiple resources 
and always interacting as part of the sociocultural world, demonstrate 
their propensity for forming particular relations.” (p. 178)
 And conclude that:
“…we hope that our discussion can prompt educators, research-
ers, and policy makers to more equitably apply the labels of gifted or 
talented, realizing the value of the perspective that nobody has talent, 
yet everybody can engage talented transactions.”
This paper was prompted initially by questions that emerged 
from being involved with the practice and study of karate.  Whilst 
recognising that in the area of movement and motor behaviour the 
term “understanding” may well be employed differently to that used 
in a more academic setting, it is, nevertheless, just as important in this 
field to analyse how people recognise understanding within themselves 
and others if we wish to make predictions about how future learning 
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may proceed, and identify implications for constructive pedagogy. 
Perkins’ (1995) flexible performance criterion for understanding seems 
particularly useful, and he himself acknowledges its applicability to 
situations that are much less academic:
“For instance when would one say that a person understands how 
to use a hammer?  Not if the person can only use a hammer in a single 
awkward and limited way.  But yes, if the person can use a hammer in 
a variety of manners in response to routine and nonroutine situational 
demands—holding the handle close to the head or far from it, using 
a shorter or longer stroke, using the claw not just to remove nails but 
straighten then when they drive crooked, and so on.  Again, flexible 
performance is key.” (p. 4)
Whilst admitting that the flexible performance criterion for 
understanding is somewhat vague, and there are still outstanding 
questions related to the kind of performances that are required in order 
to understand a specific topic and how flexible they should be, Perkins 
points out that:
“…this vagueness simply reflects the context-relative character 
of understanding.  Anything can be understood more or less deeply 
and from different perspectives.  The appropriate performances vary 
accordingly.” (p. 4)
Whilst learning and understanding are frequently differenti-
ated in people’s thinking and experience, they are clearly related to each 
other.  If learning is looked at from the perspective of a change in the 
person-world relationship, and understanding is reflected in a greater 
flexibility of performance, it follows that there is not necessarily a “cor-
rect” understanding; rather, the understanding is defined as the under-
standing arrived at by the learner which may well differ from that of 
other learners.  The learner cannot be treated in isolation or separated 
from the environment and context within which learning is taking 
place.  Improving education is not a simple matter of looking at what 
is wrong and fixing it.  The move away from what Biggs (1995) has de-
scribed as the “deficit models” of learning theory (where poor learning 
is attributed to a lack of something in the student, the teacher, or the 
Some Thoughts on Learning and Understanding
118
learning task) is surely a move in the right direction.
There are many ways in which learning and understanding have 
been conceptualized.  If progress is to be made in terms of providing 
clearer direction and guidance to those involved in pedagogy, it seems 
clear that theory needs to be derived from the context within which it 
is to be applied.  
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